Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy

Article Abstract:

The tax level in a local public goods economy tend to change with the rate of consumer movement and jurisdictional preferences. Under conditions where a finite number of consumers exists, the presence of Nash equilibra may be negated by adopting a proportional income tax scheme. On the other hand, economies that employ poll tax scheme are likely to witness the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium, although the Nash condition may manifest unsubstantial efficiency.

Taxation, Public goods, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles

Article Abstract:

The weak saddle solution for two-player, zero-sum games has existence and uniqueness, contrary to Shapley's contention. It also establishes the positive foundations of the minimal covering set by proving that the weak saddle of a tournament game exactly coincides with the minimal covering set of the corresponding tournament. This reveals the way the minimal covering set may arise resulting from strategic interaction.

Game theory

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Choquet rationality

Article Abstract:

Choquet rationality can characterize an act though that act may not possess Bernoulli rationality.

Rational expectations (Economics)

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