Interest-group competition and the organization of Congress: theory and evidence from financial services' political action committees

Article Abstract:

A positive theory of how interest-group competition shapes the organization of Congress and utilizes it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services is developed. It is argued that the modern committee system may yield a solution to a principal-agent dilemma between special-interest lobbies and legislators. Results derived from contribution patterns indicate that legislators desire the formation of specialized standing committees to help ease agency problems because of the inability to write direct fee-for-service contracts.

Political activity, Political aspects, Campaign funds, United States. Congress, Political action committees, Pressure groups, Special interest groups

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The effects of logrolling on congressional voting

Article Abstract:

Research indicates that logrolling is a key factor in congressional voting behavior, but voting models do not take vote trading into consideration. A new model uses the correlation of unobserved variables to control for unobserved ideological interest and logrolling agreements. The results cast doubt on the influence of legislators' ideological interests and indicate that vote-trading coalitions occur in some cases.

Economic aspects, Politics, Voting, Legislative bodies

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Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation and voting rules

Article Abstract:

Group decision-making practices in committees based on career concerns are analyzed. Conformity is argued to transpire in voting rules, stating differences in transparency and secretive procedures.

United Kingdom, Public affairs, Social aspects, Methods, Analysis, Decision-making, Group, Group decision making, Conformity

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