Nash Implementation of matching rules

Article Abstract:

The Nash implementability of rational solutions of matching problems is determined using the Maskin model that requires monotonicity and no veto power for implementability. The man-optimal stable rule, Pareto optimal and individually rational rules are all monotonic but fail on the no veto power requisite. Despite this limitation, the man-optimal stable rule can be considered implementable because any it can be solved by any subsolutions of the Pareto and the individually rational rule.

Rational expectations (Economics), Equilibrium (Economics), Monotonic functions

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Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?

Article Abstract:

The vulnerability of centralized two-sided matching markets to manipulation through pre-arranged matches is examined. The hospital-optimal stable matching is the most preferred by hospitals but is considered the worst stable matching for all interns. It is shown that the hospital-optimal stable rule can be manipulated. The problem, however, is that no solution exists that is both stable and non-manipulable.

Hospitals, Contracts, Interns (Medicine), Medical interns, Matching theory

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School choice: an experimental study

Article Abstract:

A study that examines the efficacy of three school choice mehanisms -- Boston, Gale Shapley and Top Trading Cycles -- which simplify the strategic choices facing parents in selecting schools, is presented.

United States, Science & research, Turkey, School, Choice of, School choice, Decision theory

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