Participation costs and efficient auctions

Article Abstract:

Analysis of the second-price auctions in models characterized by asymmetric buyers with independently distributed private valuations shows the existence of an equilibrium that is efficient, in the conventional sense. Such equilibrial efficiency is judged in terms of investment, participation costs and quality of bidding decisions. Efficiency is shown to coexist with asymmetry.

Research, Equilibrium (Economics)

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On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders

Article Abstract:

Linkage principle from auction theory loosely states that the seller's expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy. The failure of the linkage principle in common value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders is due to economic reasons.

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Disentangling the college wage premium: estimating a model with endogenous education choices

Article Abstract:

A study uses educational models to examine whether increase in college wages increases the quality of education.

Colleges & Universities, Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools, Personnel administration, Colleges and universities, Evaluation, Universities and colleges, Compensation and benefits, Education, Educational standards

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