The Economics of the Apocalypse: Modelling the Biblical Book of Revelation
Article Abstract:
The book of Revelation in the Christian Bible can be seen in economic terms. The issue of participating in non-Christian religions is addressed in the apocalypse of John. The issue can be presented in terms of present and future benefits, with consumption of non-Christian religions involving present benefits, while non-consumption involves costs in the present, but future benefits. John uses visions of Revelation to affect the incentives of consumers, and increase their imagination capital, so that believers in Christianity choose to give up taking part in non-Christian religions.
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1999
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Two noncooperative equilibria for a collusive duopoly with a finite lifespan
Article Abstract:
Companies may move between competing in terms of price and output when there is enough flexibility in capacity. This goes against the assumption that companies do not move between the two strategic variables. Noncooperative equilibria may be asymmetric, in contrast to previous assumptions. This is shown when a trigger strategy used in an oligopoly is analysed, where the oligopoly is finite. Deviants have to balance the benefits of defection and thelong-term costs.
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1997
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Collusive aspects of cost revelation through antidumping complaints
Article Abstract:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is used to investigate production costs and ascertain whether dumping has taken place. Companies do not know whether rivals face high or low costs and a complaint leads to sharing of infrmation on costs. High-cost companies can benefit from the procedure while low cost companies may face injury. This affects incentives to complain over possible dumping episodes and decisions to carry out dumping.
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1995
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