The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions: comment

Article Abstract:

John H. Kagel and Dan Levin's paper on common value auctions is in error with respect to the Nash equilibrium bid function for the public information design. Hence, the conclusions about the relation between observed and predicted effects of public information do not follow. The use of the symmetric information method is suggested because of its consistency with pure-strategy equilibrium bidding theory. In addition, flexible design is permitted in the method which allows a researcher to vary the size of the sample.

Research, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Auctions

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Do the rich get richer and the poor poorer? experimental tests of a model of power

Article Abstract:

A modeling of the Paradox of Power using the mixed-incentive, iterated-play, bilateral-interaction approach showed that the tendency of poorer agents in improving their position relative to their stronger and wealthier counterparts is governed by a Nash equilibrium that slightly drifts to a cooperative equilibrium as the game matures. The model shows that the increased interaction between non-equals shifts slowly into a cooperative mode, accounting for the improvement of the poorer agents.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Usage, Resource allocation, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics

Article Abstract:

The relation between constructivist and ecological rationalities in decision behavioral economics is examined.

United States, Decision-making, Decision making, Analysis, Rational choice theory

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