Are fines more efficient than imprisonment?
Article Abstract:
Contrary to the well-established belief in the economic analysis of criminal policy, fines are not necessarily more effective than imprisonment as mechanisms to reduce criminal activity. Fines and imprisonment serve different deterrent functions to potential criminals of different economic classes. A model is constructed to demonstrate that fines alone cannot adequately distinguish the behavioral choices between wealthy and poor offenders. A combination of imprisonment and a less-than-maximum fine can actually be a more efficient deterrent in most real-world cases.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1993
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Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance
Article Abstract:
Regulatory errors were shown to affect the optimal penalty in a hierarchical enforcement structure. The optimal penalty becomes non-maximal despite the neutral risk condition of offenders and the lesser degree of private benefit from violation compared to the social cost for everyone. Finite fines were found to be unable to reach optimal levels given an identical hierarchical structure unlike in error-free monitoring. Total compliance results from equilibrium amid errors, while partial compliance may be achieved by the regulator if no errors existed.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1995
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Note on Ricardian equivalence
Article Abstract:
Analysis of the Ricardian equivalence concepts usually center on the idea of a dynastic extended family in which the utility of each generation depends on the utilities of its descendants and its own consumption. Other factors can also lead to observations of the Ricardian result, either exactly or approximately. One factor is the capitalization of property taxes into the value of the property. Another factor is that the bequest itself could be a variable in the parental utility functions.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1993
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