"Damned if you do, damned if you don't": government and the conundrum of consultation in the environmental sector
Article Abstract:
This paper examines three separate episodes of government consultation in the environmental sector involving the activities of a chemical plant owned by Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. in Elmira, a small town in southwestern Ontario near Kitchener. The first episode involved the creation in the early 1980s of two advisory committees at two separate levels of government (municipal and provincial) in order to explore the options available for containing the spread of contaminants from the Uniroyal site. During this episode, these two advisory committees made recommendations to the provincial Ministry of the Environment (MOE) that conflicted with the advice of its own officials. Ultimately, the consultative process merely exacerbated what was an already tense situation. The second episode centred on Uniroyal's proposal in 1989 to build an incinerator on its site in order to dispose of the plant's waste products. The final episode in this drama began in 1992, when yet another advisory committee was created by the MOE to monitor the situation at Uniroyal. On the basis of our examination, we conclude that if a government decides not to clarify the intended role of a citizens' advisory group and not to devolve real decision-making power to it, then it can expect to reap the unfortunate consequences of heightened mistrust and public cynism. Attempts by a government simply to inform one of its creations (an advisory group) are likely to be viewed as manipulation by the members of a group, which inevitably becomes a bit like Frankenstein's monster, endowed with a will and a life of its own. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Canadian Public Administration
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0008-4840
Year: 1998
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The formation of a Canadian privacy policy: the art and craft of lesson-drawing
Article Abstract:
For some cases of policy innovation, traditional models of the policy process based on assumptions of power and conflict are not helpful guides. This article suggest that it is often just as important to understand the pattern of learning or lesson-drawing that takes place during policy development. With reference to the formation of Canadian privacy policy, as expressed in the Privacy Act of 1982, it is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the experience of other countries' legislative attempts to protect personal data were instrumental in shaping a Canadian policy. Lessons about the principles of data protection, the exemptions to those principles, and the policy instrument to implement them were drawn at critical stages from American, and other, experience. The fact that some lessons were drawn and not others, from some countries and not others, helps us understand why Canadian privacy policy is as it is today. The article concludes by noting the conditions for lesson-drawing across boundaries to influence policy: a basic consensus on goals; a low salience in public opinion; a dominant role for bureaucrats; a high degree of innovation; and the existence of exemplars. The timing, then, of foreign privacy laws was crucial, highlighting the importance of studying public policy in both comparative and historical perspectives. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Canadian Public Administration
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0008-4840
Year: 1990
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Quebec's Caisse de depot et placement: tool of nationalism?
Article Abstract:
Caisse de Depot et Placement de Quebec was created in 1963 by the Conseil d'o rientation Economique du Quebec. It was to be a contributory pension plan allowing for the accumulation of a retirement fund which would be a reservoir of capital for the government. Caisse's charter itemized four classes of investments: (1) corporate securities, (2) government bonds and guaranteed issues of public authorities, (3) mortgages and real estate and (4) equity holdings. The charter stipulated limits on the amount that could be invested in these various areas. Recently accusations have been made that the investment policy of the fund is influenced by the Parti Quebocois government. Careful investigation of investments show little evidence of this. Instead the main consideration in investment decisions is usually a competitive return on investments. There is a relationship between Quebec governments and the fund, economic policy is not determined by it.
Publication Name: Canadian Public Administration
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0008-4840
Year: 1985
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