Competitive tax theory in open economies

Article Abstract:

Multiple governments linked by factor and goods trade and forced to impose distortionary taxes on a mobile tax base are competitive to the extent that the excess tax burden is internalized. Analysis shows that the equilibrium allocations generated under competition are not constrained efficient. The traditional view that the tax burden is internalized by each government's taking world prices as fixed is challenged by the fact that collectively, governments' decisions affect world prices. Pricing of the governments' net tax base consumption appears to best preserve decentralized decision-making.

Expenditures, Public, Public expenditures, Allocation (Taxation), Tax allocation

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The persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local public expenditures

Article Abstract:

The implications of relaxing the assumption that taxes allow a community to effectively have complete control over the allocation of resources within its borders are examined. A simple model is presented that uses property taxes on housing and separate taxes on immobile land and mobile capital used in housing production as a basis for proving two main theses. First, property tax emerges at equilibrium as the sole source of government revenue, which enables the local government to avoid direct individual taxation. Second, the equilibrium allocations cannot be considered 'constrainted efficient.'

Finance, taxation, & monetary policy, Property taxes, Property tax, Real property tax, Real property taxes, Local finance

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A model of monopoly with strategic government intervention

Article Abstract:

A study develops a formal model of interactions between business enterprises and government in which a multinational company chooses the producer price and the government opts for the ad valorem tax rate to maximize the collection of revenues. A hypothetical situation calls for the company to choose its technology and the corresponding cost function. An endogenized ad valorem tax and specific or per-unit tax will result in the government's choice of the ad valorem system in a perfect equilibrium scenario.

Research, International business enterprises, Multinational corporations, Intervention (Federal government), Federal intervention

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