Voluntary contributions to united charities

Article Abstract:

The economics of giving charitable contributions through united charities rather than direct to individual charities was studied. It was suggested that united charities improves welfare because giving through them lessens the fundraising costs incurred by separate charities. A framework of private contributions to united charities was analyzed in a subgame perfect equilibrium model. It was concluded that united charities do not have an advantage in collecting from private donors and that the welfare advantage of giving through them was uncertain.

Educational, religious, etc. trusts, Models, Economic aspects, Finance, Social services, Social service, Charitable trusts, Game theory

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Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence

Article Abstract:

An experiment to examine the consequences of permitting individuals to contribute a part of their endowment to a threshold public good was conducted. A randomly chosen group of Canadian graduate and undergraduate students were recruited for what was called a 'decision making game.' It was discovered that allowing continuous instead of 'all-or-nothing' contributions, a money back guarantee and high rewards significantly increased contributions.

Public goods, Altruism, Altruism (Human behavior)

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Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective

Article Abstract:

Research is presented describing the study of donor identification by charitable organizations in correlation with donor status, public awareness and association.

Charities

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