Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators

Article Abstract:

Arrow's impossibility theorem is examined in a context where there are invisible dictators and many agents. The results of previous work in this area are examined and extended on, with implications for social welfare.

Social aspects, Economic policy

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On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators

Article Abstract:

Pareto and dictatorial rules are compared, and the properties of Pareto rules are examined in detail. A Pareto rule is developed that is homologically equivalent to a dictatorial rule, but not Pareto isotopic to it.

Economic aspects, Social choice

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Nonmonotonic Choquet integrals

Article Abstract:

Welfare, asset pricing, and preference implications of an analysis of Choquet integrals are analyzed in detail, focusing on signed Choquet integrals.

Research, Integrals

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