Credible threats in extortion
Article Abstract:
An analysis of credibility in extortion reveals that as the number of extorted parties increase, the credibility of the extorters are decreased. The study also reveals that the credibility problem makes a reduction in the number of extorted parties paramount and an increase in the frequency of reductions could explain the increase in instability between gangs and the occurrence of gang wars.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1997
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Some empirical evidence on the property rights of first peoples
Article Abstract:
An analysis of the property rights concepts of Native Americans suggests that the varying concepts of real property are influenced by the physical and community characteristics. Factors that have been found to influence property rights concepts include deadweight costs, governance costs, exclusion costs of establishing and maintaining different property access concepts.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1997
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