On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation

Article Abstract:

The study characterizes equilibria of games with two properties, firstly the agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; and secondly they can only add to their initial amounts. This equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stakelberg outcomes.

Game theory

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Price determination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising

Article Abstract:

A model on advertising and price distributions was evaluated by using different probabilities, different buyers with identical preferences. The results show that more asymmetric equilibrium corresponds to higher volume of transactions and higher expected transaction prices.

Advertising expenditures

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A comment on: eRevisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costsE

Article Abstract:

A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for all values of switching cost c is characterized. It is shown that findings on the sustainability of tacit collusion are unchanged for this MPE.

Analysis, Cost (Economics), Costs (Economics)

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