Observable preferences for public goods: a note on the incentive compatibility of inferring demand for public goods from private goods demand

Article Abstract:

The proposition that demand for public goods can be known through an analysis of demand for related private goods does not hold true in all instances. This theory is based on the practical assumption that a consumer would have to distort his consumption of a certain private good to misrepresent his preference for a public good. This assumption is shown to be valid for many but not all cases.

Supply and demand, Consumer preferences

---

Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach

Article Abstract:

A new model for experiments with the voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods is presented. It is suggested that aggregate behaviour can be characterized by a multiple-step function, both for average behaviour over time and for behaviour in the final experimental phase.

Administration of General Economic Programs, Economic Statistics & Research, Economic conditions

---

Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

Article Abstract:

A revelation mechanism for the production of public goods is presented.

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: A micro model of the criminal's location choice. The demand for rental housing: evidence from the housing allowance demand experiment
• Abstracts: Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism. Why do people pay taxes?
• Abstracts: Reward structures in public good experiments. Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty. After you - endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games
• Abstracts: Taxes and the location of production: evidence from a panel of US multinationals. Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.