Incentive systems in a real effort experiment

Article Abstract:

In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects. Payments based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions. [C] 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: J3; J33 Keywords: Payment schemes; Experiment

Economic research

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Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods

Article Abstract:

Voluntary and binary contributions for step-level public goods were examined in models of value orientation and the expectations of individuals on the benefits of public goods. The impact of increasing the benefits of public goods was studied in a game involving 228 subjects in the University of Amsterdam. The determination of expectations, the use of expectations and the differences of expectations among the subjects were investigated. It was concluded that individuals contribute if the expected value of contributing was greater than expected value of not contributing.

Economic aspects, Public goods, Rational expectations (Economics), Value (Economics)

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Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure

Article Abstract:

Asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. Selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational's information rent that is protected from a host government's confiscatory taxation. [C] 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: F23; F34; G15; H87 Keywords: Foreign investment; Intra-firm trade; Hold-up problem

Intnl Marketing, Analysis, Usage, Foreign investments, Taxation, International business enterprises, Multinational corporations, International trade, Export marketing, Opportunity cost, Opportunity costs

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